Analyses and sensitivity studies related to postlaunch recontamination of spacecraft and the probability of contamination of a planet Final report by unknown
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 
of the material. However, it is the best reproduction available from the original 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19710011004 2020-03-11T20:39:22+00:00Z
\xo-
K
cin
JE T PR O P U , L S I ON LAB ORA T 0 R Y
CALIFORNIA INSTI T U T E  O F T EC H NO L OG Y
P A S A D E N A, CA L I FOR N I A
^	 (q E _^^ R
	
^	 (71	 9 0 A 	 RUI
0 (PAGE L-ft	 (C0D
	
(NASA CR RTI MXOR -AD NUMBER)	 (CATEGORY)
ANALYSES AND SENSITIVITY'STUDIES RELATED TO
POST-LAUNCH RECONTAMINATION OF SPACECRAFT
AND THE PROBABILITY OF CONTAMINATION OF A PLANET
71-2-5
FINAL REPORT
DECEMBER 30 2 1970
_ -	 ABSTRACT
---
	 Analyses of the probability of post-launch recontamination of spacecraft
and the subsequent probability of planetary contamination were performed for fly-by,
orbiter and lander capsule unmanned planetary missions.
	 Sources of microbial con-
tamination, pertinent mission events and spacecraft design and operating characteris-1
tics were identified and analyzed.
	 The recontamination of the spacecraft from the
shroud during the launch phase was identified as a problem common to all types of
missions.	 The additional factor of redistribution of organisms from the non-sterile
portions of the spacecraft to the attached lander capsule prior to capsule de-orbit
was also studied.
t
Studies were made of the sensitivity of the probability - of planetary
contamination to the various factors involved in recontamination for the three'--i
t	 e^ of missions.yp s 	 Of the various factors, t e probability of . partic1c Coc:.ti0..
from spacecraft surfaces was found to be of greatest significance for all missions.
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.' ejecta included the external spacecraft surfaces only, with contamination from
internals stems	 large non sterile im actables and orbital decay of hardware
^y
, 	g	
-	 p
not-considered=
Analytical modeling of the hardware sources, mission events and_recon-
- 'tamination factors was performed. 	 This included the development of 'equations
relating the sources, events and factors.
	 Curves were plotted to show the
,- sensitivity of the probability of-planetary contamination to the pertinent
recontamination factors.
Evaluations were performed of relationship of the- 'microbial burden at a
specific mission event for a given element of the system to the burden at a
previous event, as influenced by recontamination from another portion of the
system.	 For instance, the ratio of the burden on -the spacecraft at encounter
to that at shroud separation was evaluated as a function of the probability
i
of ejection during cruise a - d^ the number of events which provide a force.
sufficient to dislodge!an organism from the spacecraft surfaces.	 Dislodging
' events were identified as midcourse firings, attitude control system firings
and deployment of appendages for all spacecraft, and also separation of the
bioshield cap and hander capsule for lander missions,
.. For all missions,' the probability of-contamination of the planet was
shown to	 proportional to the	 on the spacecraft at encounter.be directly	 burden
I This burden was shown to be exponentially related to the probability of ejection
during 'cruise.	 The probability of contaminating the planet either by post-
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The objective of the effort described herein was to performanalyses and
sensitivity studies to delineate those spacecraft events which sufficiently
impact the allocation for the overall probability of contamination of a planet
to merit _further evaluation • by analytical and experimental means.
The scope of the analysis included studies of non-sterile fly-by and
orbiter spacecraft, as well as a sterile lander capsule attached to a non-sterile
orbiter spacecraft. Contamination of the planet by ejecta released after en-
counter bythe fly-by and orbiter spacecraft was considered. The source of
encounter ejecta or by recontamination of a sterile lander c-apsule was found
to be sensitive to the probability of ejecting an organism from the space-
craft. For the lander capsule, mission and design constraints were identified
which would minimize- recontamination.	 --
k recommendation is made for expanding - the analytical model of recon-
tamination of the lander capsule, which would involve developing more de-
taile& equations,fo,r burden redistribution than presented in this report.
These equations would be in a form suitable for computer programming with both
probability distributions and discrete values as input and output. 	 These
equations would -'identify the physical factors associated with the relative
probabilities.	 Analytical studies to determine the probabilities of ejection,
3
transfer andadhesion of organisms should be continued, supported by experi-
mental data if available.
Because of the sensitivity to the probability of ejection, knowledgei
of the burden at shroud separation is important. 	 This requirement establishes
the need to . evaluate the transfer ofburden to the spacecraft from the shroud
during launch and for a precise estimation of the probability of organism
ejection from spacecraft surfaces during cruise and after encounter,
t
2.0	 INTRODUCTION	
-
2.1
	
General Statement of Problem
Contamination of a planet with microbial organisms of terrestrial
origin can occur as;a consequence of exploration by unmanned spacecraft.
These organisms are'-present -on the spacecraft as a result of normal manu-
facturing, assembly 'and testing operations, and will remain until launch
unless; removed by surface decontamination of'terminal_heat sterilization.
For spacecraft which are not intended toland on a planetary surface, re-
duction of microbial burden by such methods is not normally provided.	 A
non-sterile- spacecraft may receive microbic& burden during the launch phase
from the shroud in addition to the original burden on the"-s acecraft at launch.p
This increase in burden is termed "recontamination".	 For lander missions,
sterile portions of the spacecraft are susceptible to transfer of organisms
2
.:	 v
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from non-sterile spacecraft hardware during the entire mission. This re-
distribution of burden is also termed "recontamination."
-Whether recontamination of planetary spacecraft as a result of
post-launch events does or does not significantly affect the overall.
probability of contamination of a planet depends upon the events which
occur subsequent to recontamination.	 These events include the survival
of microbial organisms in space, their transport to the planet and release
and growth in its atmosphere or on its surface.	 If the values for those
factors used on the Planetary Quarantine analysis are sufficiently small,
Then the recontamination problem is not of significance.	 However, recent
experimental and analytical studies have indicated that the values for
these factors are:such that recontamination of the spacecraft may indeed
w be _a factor of concern.1 	 This is particularly true for a lander mission
where the probability that a viable organism may be transported to the
planet if it is on the lander may be high enough to result in violation of
the quarantine constraint.
Much work has been done to identify events which may occur during
the performanceiof a planetary mission and 'result in recontamination of the
Analytical studies have identified 	 ar,ametric relation-spacecraft.	 2'3'4	 S	 p
p'	 y	
-_
shi s for man	 factors involved in these events, and subsequent experi-
mentation has produced values for several of the parameters. 	 Further-
analyses and, experiments have been suggested for the determination of values
for other parameters.
-	 It was the purpose of this effort to identify those aspects of the
r econtamination problem to which the overall-probability of planetary con-
tmination is especially sensitive.	 For these specific aspects, further	 w
-	 ; experimentation or analytical investigations may bewarranted to obtain
quantitative data on the probability of occurrence of events related to
i transport, survival or release of viable microbial organisms during plane-
I
tary ,missions.
-j
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2.3	 Scope	 -
The scope of the effort included fly-by, orbiter and lander
m scions.	 T e mission profiles utilized are typified by the Mariner-Mars
' 69 for the fly-by, Mariner-Mars-'71 for the orbiter and Viking '75 for
,	 i
the lander mission.	 The analysis did not consider the release of viable
organisms from spacecraft Jnternal systems, nor the contamination of the
lanes b	 im actable hardware
	
such as an upper sta a or separationP  
	
y	 P	 ^	 PP	 g	 P	
debris', which is not intended to land on' the ` planet.	 Contamination of',
JI
 
the ;g anet rroli^ decay of t::;. orb-it of n hioshield or an orbiting space-
t'
,
graft, or from trajectory errors relative to aim-point biasing, was like-
-r
wise outside the scope of this effort.
The effort was conducted under JPL Contract-953009, "Analyses
' and	 y StudiesR_ el ated to Post- aunch Recontamination of Space-Sensitv t
craft and the Probability o',f Contamination of a Planet." 	 The approximate
expenditure of effort was two man-months,'over a ten week period, excluding;
preparation of this final report.
3.0	 TECHNICAL DISCUSSION
3.1	 Literatufre Study	 -
Sources of information on recontamination were identified and re-
viewed to provide a consolidation of - previous analyses and experimental.
efforts.	 A bibliography of identified documents is presented as Appendix A.
! 4 
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'	 From an examination of the data available in the literature, the following
is apparent:
x,
a. The information in the literature is rarely expressed as
probability of occurrence of an event; rather, the
literature primarily contains estimates of the magnitude
of the severity of the interplanetary environment from
the standpoint of 1 micrometeoroid flux, solar wind, and
magnetic forces. Table I presents a summary of proba-
bility values obtained from the literature. Values of
pertinent variables are included in theabstracts of
selected references presented in Appendix A.
	 -
k
I	 b. The reported ex erimental results and analyticalP	 P
conclusions axe based on a wide range of assumptions
f
and constraints, including specific assumptions re -
garding design characteristics, material properties and
mission profiles. 'AA a result, correlation of quanti-,
tative values is exceedingly difficult. No attempt
was made to perform this correlation.
--Because of'the above factors, little use could be made of quanti-
tative information obtained from the literature in performance of the sensi -
tivity analyses.
3.2 Analysis
The primary emphasis of the effort was on determining the sensitivity
of the probability of planetary contamination to factors affecting the recon
taination of spacecraft._._..
-^ Analyses were conducted for fly-by and, orbiter missions initially,
A	 I
--	
-
then exp,3nded to cover the case of a landing capsule. The general approach'
and constraints are cormnon to all three missions, permitting the analysis to
I
PARAMETER 'VALUE SOURCE
Probability of re;contam- pr - 1.1 x 10 4 Ref. 2
ination from micro-
meteoroid puncture for
typical Mars mission
Probability of surviving 'Pr = 10-3 Ref. 2
environment
Probability of surviving Pr-= 10-5 -Ref. 2
- er►Cry,	 etc.
Probability of surviving- Pr 7 x 10 8 Ref. 3
UV kill for single
- organism
Fraction of organisms .02 <	 Pr <	 .1 Ref.- 3
ejected at bioshield
opening
Probabil'l"ty of contam- Pr = 4 x 10_5 Ref. 3
inating Mars as a
result of reeontamin-
aft g a lander
- --- - --- -----
be developed first for the fly-by and then expanded to meet the needs ofthe
orbiter and lander mis-sions. The similarity of the recontamination factors
for the three missions is illustrated by Figure 1.
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De-orbit
The event in the lander flight sequencewhich
=! commits the mission to intentional penetrationk,
of the planetary atmosphere and impact on the
surface by the capsule.
.: Election
The release of an organism from--a surface with
su-fficient velocit
y
 to_escap a from that surface,	 e^
except as otherwise defined herein.,
k : Encounter
The phase of the mission comprising the closest
a	 approach to the planet on the fly-by mission,
or the period of the orbit insertion firing for
orbiter and lander missions.
I s, Final Stage
a The item of flight equipment which imparts the
heliocentric injector. tielac: , to the spacecraft.
Launch
- The mission phase which begins at lift-off and
terminates 'with injection of the spacecraft into
a heliocentric trajectory.
,^	 I
f _
Recontamination
An increase in viable microbial burden over a base-
line value at launch due to transport from a b.io-
logically contaminated source. 	 For the fly-by and
orbiter missions, recontamination canonly occur
during the launch phase from the "shroud and launch
vehicle.	 For the lander mission, recontamination_,
,
also includes redistribution of organisms from the
spacecraft or bioshield to the previously sterile
landing capsule.
—	
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Redistribution
The transfer of organisms from one element of
F., flight ;equipment to another, such as from the
r shroud to the spacecraft or the boshield to
i
the capsule.
Separation
The phase of the mission comprising the physical
separation of flight equipment items, such as
the capsule and spacecraft, the displacement of
n the items due to an imparted relative velocity,
and any spacecraft for capsule operations, such
as re-stabilization, which immediately follow.
Spacecraft
Tle item of flight equipment which is launched
i.a into a heliocentric trajectory to encounter the
target planet.	 At encounter, the spacecraft
either cent .n les on a. fly-by past the planet or
. is injected into an orbit about the planet.	 In
ro
the lander mission, the spacecraft carriesa
capsule which is dispatched to the planetary
rr surface.
Transfer	
,w
The physical displacement of an organism from one	 E
element of flight equipment to another, 'due to a
combination of ejection velocity from the source, 	 z
geometrical factors affording impact and/or----
attractive forces to the recontaminated item.-
,	 I
<	 < 3.2. 1.2	 Notation
I
.j_ Figure 4 illustrates the notation system used in this report 	 n,
in i -the form of a segment of a model representing the relationship between two 	 ar,
;i cor more events, soures and recontamination factors.	 Table II <summarizes the
E
subscripts used; in the analysis.
12	 '
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FIGURE 4, NOTATION EXAMPLE
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NOTATION FOR RECONTAMINATION ANALYSIS
i'th Item of flight
Equipment jth Mission Event
,
kth Factor 
C
C
apsule	 _ Launch L Ejected (From)	 'EJ
Bioshield B Shroud Separation SS Survives (During) 	 SUR
Spacecraft. Sc Encounter EN Transfer (From/To) T
Shroud SH; Bioshield Separation BS Adhere (From/To) 	 A
Launch Vehicle LV 
1
Ro 70=419
TABLE II
r`
{
i
i
Parameters describe either the number-of organisms: N , or
'the probability of occurrence of an event: P. The utilization of subscripts is
as follows, referring to Figure 4 for illustration:
N	 - The number of organisms on the ith item of flight equipment at
13, 7
}	 the jth mission event
L
I.
Ro 70-w419
3.2.2 Analysis of a 	 Mission
The generalized profile for the fly-by mission is shown in
Figure 5. The pertinent mission events and factors which contribute to space-
craft recontamination and contamination of the planet are shown schematically
in Figure b Tle'source of contamination with which we are concerned is the
viable vjecta from the spacecraft surfaces, consistent with our exclusion of
large impactables and internal system ejecta The probability of contamination
from eecta is expressed as
T
rgym, , 1
70-419`--
the spacecraft and entry into the planetary atmosphere.
For the fly-by mission, the short time of exposure
induces this term to effectively equal unity.
-	
the organism surviving entry intobabilitfP	 Pro	 y oSA
the planetary atmosphere.
PI and PSA are values with distributions corresponding to the
time of ejection relative to encounter, mass-and velocity of the ejected particle,
mass properties of the planet and the atmospheric characteristics. 	 They are the
actual variables in the Pk term, which is expressed as a parameter in Figure 69
the plot of
Pc	 PR	 PC	 =	 N^,J P,	 (2)
f t	
SC
Figure 6 identifies the parameter of concern in evaluating the probability of
icontamina -tion as the number of organisms ejected from the spacecraft. 	 To determine
'NEJ 	 we must know the number of organisms on the spacecraft at encounter,
SC	 -
N	 I	 , and then introduce the assumpti^n that all of the a jecta will =be releasedSC,EN
in a sufficiently brief time period that the post-encounter PEJ 	 will be a single
discrete value.	 We may then write	 SC
NEJSC
	N
__SC,EN	 PEJSC	 (3)
The sp'acecraft.burden at encounter is 'a value which we can relate to the burden
At other points in the mission, the principal one being shroud, separation., 	 This
'.
allows us'to evaluate the effect of organisms ejected during cruise by ratoirg
the burden at encounter to that at shroud separation. 	 This expression is
NSC,E	 NSC, SS	 PSUR	 {1 - PE J	 ) n	 (4)
.: —	 - C	 SC	 -
_,
Where'n denotes the number of dislodging events between shroud separation and
encounter and PSUR	 the probability of surviving the cruise phase. 	 The assumption
herein is that eacfi event, including engine firings, attitude control system	 _.^
actuations, micrometeoroid; hits 'and deployment of appendages, ejects organisms
with equal probability and imparts to them sufficient velocity to escape the
gravitational and electrostatic :.:^fluence of the	 pacecraft.	 PSUR	 is taken
C
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as a constant and the sensitivity of the burden ratio to it not evaluated.
Figure 8 shows the sensitivity of the burden ratio to the
probability lof ejection and the number of dislodging events. The curves
illustrate that the burden ratio becomes very sensitive'to the probability
of ejection beyond approximately P
EJ	
1 indicating the need for
SC
determining the actual values of P
EJ 
for the specific mission and space-
SC
craft configuration. Foran actual, mission, the curves of interest will
be for--n > 10 since a minimum number of events must occur for the space-
craft to'achieve encounter and perform its operational functions.
We have introduced the assumption that the post-encounter
dislodgement of organisms occurs as a single event with the same proba-
bility of ejection as each pre-encounter dislodgement. The justification
for this assump tion is that the time during which the spacecraft is in the
vicinity of the planet:.Iis very short relative to the cruise phase, and the -
likelihood of performing more than one reorientation or stabilization maneuver
is small. Appendages will have beendeployed and no further course corrections
are required. The number of organisms ejected during this event can be related
to the burden at shroud separation by
n
N	 N	 P	 P	 (l	 P	 (5)
EJ	 SC SS	 SUR	 EJ	 __EJSC I
	
C	 S-C-	 SC
This' expression yields, in non-dimensional form, the ejected burden
on the event following n previous dislodging events. That is
.
,.n-events have
occurred since shroud^separation__,to release organisms and thereby reduce the
burden on the spacecraft at encounter. The next event releases a number of
organisms expressed by N	 N-EJ	 S CISS
so
Figure 9 1 shows equation (5) plotted with n as a parameter. The. --- 1--i
fact that each curve has a maximum and decreases as P
EJ	
approaches either
SC -
The physical interpretatio'n:of - t e, curves0 orIl is of particular interest..	 h;
is that -,--- for very low PEJ	 the spacecraft is still highly contam i- n-at-dd- -
SC
(relative to its burden at shroud separation) ., but there is a low probability
I^V
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of organisms being ,released in apost-encounter event.	 For the other extreme,
where 
PEJ	
approaches unity, almost all of the organisms are shaken off early
SC
F= in the cruise phase, leaving a relatively clean spacecraft at encounter. Even
though the burden at encounter has a high probability of being released in the
latter case, the low burden at this time will result in a low quantity of
ejecta being released at a post-encounter event.	 The curves of interest will
again be for n	 > 10, as established previously.	 We see that the burden ratio
is mote sensitive to PEJ
	
between the maximum and unity, providing a reduction 	 `.
R
_	
SC
of an order of magnitude or more.-in the burden ratio for doubling the value
of PEJ	 It is therefore of importance to know the actual value of PEJ
•	 I ^	 SC	 SC
!	 for the mission and spacecraft configuration of interest to determine whether
the value is on the steep side of the maximum - where the burden- ratio is
extremely sensitive, or to the left where the ratio varies directly with P
EJSC	
+`
Itis also important to establish, through mission and design analysis, the'
number of dislodging events prior to encounter, in order to determine which
curve to use.
-'	 In the analysis presented above, the burden on the spacecraft
at shroud separation was considered as the initial condition and ratios for
;'. this burden or baselwere used.	 -For an actual mission, this burden level can -
.	 t
not be measured directly but can only be estimated from the burden determinedi  ,
. y	 y	 encapsulation.	 Assuming neither increase or decrease in burdenb	 assa  at
level from encapsulation to launch, the only factors affecting the burden
level on the spacecraft are those which occur during the launch phase, primarily
' the transfer of organisms from the shroud to the spacecraft. 	 This relationship
= is expressed by
:i SC	 SH,L	 EJSH;SC,SS	 2,L	 TSH/SC-	 ASC
Y: -	 The above expression is plotted in Figure 10, which shows N 	 as a function[^
--
__J
-
t
of the `original burden on, the spacecraft at launch, NSC L	 and the organismsI
i
:
transferred from the shroud.	 This increase in burden is the recontamination
i
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mechanism for the fly-by spacecraft, assuming for this analysis that the
original burden on the spacecraft is not dislodged by shock and vibration,	 -`
but increased by the amount transferred from the shroud and adhering to
the spacecraft
From Figure 10, we can see that N 	 is controlled bySC,SS
either the original burden on the spacecraft or that transferred f--om the
shroud, depending on the relative magnitude of these sources. Initially,
let us assume that all of the burden on the shroud is ejected, transferred
to and adheres to the spacecraft. Then, an equal number of organisms on
the spacecraft and shroud at launch will result in a doubling of the burden
on the spacecraft at shroud-separation. This may be regarded as relatively
insensitive, given the level of precision of microbiological assay data.
If the shroud contribution is greater than the spacecraft original- burden
by an order of magnitude-or more, however, the shroud contribution becomes
	
"	 the controlling factor and the spacecraft may effectively be ignored in
	
`-	 its effect on N	 In this case, no benefit will be _accrued from re-
	
SC,SS	 _
ducing the spacecraft burden to a very low level by cleaning, as NSG,SS
is effectively the shroud contribution. It therefore becomes important to
determine what the probabilities are associated with transfer of organisms
from the-shroud. This wil11-permit us to establish the value of knowing the
spacecraft'burden or the value of deliberately reducing its magnitude through
decontamination operations or'use of contamination control facilities.
A brief example is presented to llustra a the sensitivity
relationships developed above, using the following values;
4
P = .-40 _	 allocation for mission
PR = 1.0	 for surface burden which impact the
	
_.J
	
planet as ejecta
-4 for Mars surfacePG 	 10
P3UR	 .1	 for cruise phaseC
25
s	 _
PSURPN = 1.0	 for encounter phase
PT	.l
PSA	 1
P	 _ ..1
EJSC
n	 30
due to high encounter velocity and
fly-by trajectory:
due to entry heating if the organism
does impact the"planet
for each dislodging event
dislodging events before encounter
-C	
.♦
-	
..	 a	 r 	 H'	 w. 
a
_i..	 a	 ^, z _
;2 0	 .^	 Y 9
.:n
if the shroud burden level is greater than 10 5g	 and the effect of the space -,
craft original burden decreases as the shroud contribution increases. Because
N
SC SS is sensitive to shroud burden transfer, knowledge of P
	 , PT
- SH	 SH/SC
and ,PA become important if accurate determination of NSC,SS is required.
SC
Therefore, we must evaluate how NSC SS affects NEJ in terms of sensitivity
^	 SC
to PEJSC
Let us recompute our example with P 	 = . 2, which doubles the
EJSC
value used originally. The number of organisms allowable on the spacecraft
is now half as many, or 5 x 10 2 at encounter. The allowable ejecta remains
the same, but the allowable burden at shroud separation increases as shown
by Figure 9. We read, for n = 30;
N	 P N SC, SSE J	 .00003	 (12)
1	 SC
f
.` which is more than an order of magnitude. decrease from equation (11)'. This
­fields a value of
N	 = 102 / 3x10 5 	3.3x106	 (13)
j	 SC,SS
The sensitivity of the probability of contamination to P EJ is thus shown by'
SC
the fact that doubling the PEJ results in more than a ten -fold increase in
t:. SC
`r	 the allowable burden
-'
at-shroud separation. This-is due to the greater reduction
in burden prior to encounter.
`
	
	
The following conclusions are offered for the fly -by spacecraft
based on the above sensitivity analysis:
1. The probability! of contaminating the planet is directly
p
p
 oportional to the number of organisms ejected from the
s acecraft, which is exponentially related to the proba-
bility of ejecting,organisms from the surface during cruise'
and encounter. For this reason, accurate knowledge of the
actual value of 
PEJ 
is required to determine the allowable
SC
burden at shroud separation.
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2 Since the allowable burden at shroud separation may be
critical, its sensitivity to the shroud contribution
must be recognized and quantitative data on PEJ
SC
P	 and P	 obtained through analysis or
TSH/SC	 ASC
experimentation,
3.2.3 Analysis of an Orbiter Mission
The mission =profile - for the orbiter spacecraft is shown in
Figure 11. The events and factors which contribute to spacecraft recon-
tamination and contamination of the planet may be represented by the same
chart as presented in Figure 5^for - the fly-by. The constraint placed on
the fly-by mission regarding the exclusion of large impactables as a source;
of concern for this analysis is also applicable to the orbiter analysis,
as is the decay of the spacecraft orbit. Both of these sources represent
real po^cn 4` , a1 	 planetary contamination, but since they concern the^
impact of non-sterile hardware and not ` ejecta, we have excluded them from
this analysis.
	
-	 --
The effects ofil the recontamination of the spacecraft from the
shroud during launch and the reduction of viable organisms during cruise are
similar to those for the fly-by spacecraft, and 'the equations and curves`
presented earlier do hold. The mission profile, Figure 11, shows. the
departure'- from-the fly-by mission in that there are m.post-encounter dis-
lodging events over a time periodwhich exceeds the cruise phase by an
oraer of magnitude or more.
Figure 12 showsthe analytical model used for evaluating- the
effect -of post-encounter dislodging events. The total . ejecta from m events
is related to the burden on-the spacecraft at encounter by.
`	 m
N	 ) / N	 _ 1 - (1 P )m	 (14)SCi	 SC,EN	 EJi = 1
I	
,
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The assumption used previously for the fly-by mission that each
post-encounter event occurs with the same probability as those during cruise
has been applied to ;the orbiter case. The expression for the burden at encounter
NSC, gN / NSC, SS	 ( 1 P ) n	 (15)EJ
is valid for the orbiter analysis as it was for the fly -by analysis. Combining
the above with equation (14), we have
IM	 rt
n	 n+m
	SC,i	 SC SS	 EJ	 -EJ
Figure 13 shows the relationships expressed by the above equation
for the assumptions that pre- and post-encounter probabilities of ejection are
equal and that m - 10n, recognizing the .order of magnitude difference between
n and m. The sensitivity of the burden ratio to the probability of ejection
g	 ated. Also maximum burdenof interept is the fact that the is a ain- demonstr	
o
_transferred to the planet 'is;approximately constant at about70% of the bur den
at- shroud separation. Frow the above anal *sis we can .draw the Game conclusions
for the orbiter mission that were stated for the fly-by, relative to the
	
importance of determining P 	 and evaluating the Affects of the shroud
SC
contribution., ; Also, mission and spacecraft design must be evaluated for the
pEcific-application to determine the values of n and m to be used. Estimation
of the value of PEJ applicable to the specific application, is required to
SC
utilize Figure 13 to determine the data points on the steep side of the maximum
for the given value of n where lens-Itiv ty--is.greatest.
I
	
3.2.'!4 Analysis of a Lander Capsule Mission 	 -
The mission profile for the lander capsule is shown in Figure 14
and a t ical"s pacecraft and lander capsule conyp ^	 	 	 figuration-is shown in-_Figure 15.
We have retained the constraints regarding contamination by large impactables,
including decay of the orbiter and`bioshield cap. The recontamination problem
I
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is more complex than for the fly-by and s-pacecraft, in that we are concerned
not only with increasing the burden on the spacecraft and bios_hield cap
during the launch phase, but also with redistribution of burden between the
spacecraft, bioshield cap and 1 lander capsule. The eventual objective of the
analysis is, in fact, the determination of the burden on the dander capsule
at the time of de--orbit, The burden at de orbit may be related to the proba -
bility of contamination by 	 i
Pc	 NC,DO	 (;	 Pk) PR PG 	 (17)
p	 discussed inand the roduct terms of interest are P	 P 
^N 
and P as d
	 ;
I	 S	 SA
3.2 ,.2. Due ,to the existence of an intentional impact as ,a consequence of
performing the deorbit°maneuver, P I will equal unity; P S
	
	and ,P must
N
be evaluated fob the actual mission. Once this is done, Pc  PR 
PG 
may be
evaluated by using Figure 7 as discussed for the fly-by spacecraft-.
r	 The complex inter-relationships in the redistribution of viable
organisms between items of flight equ rmnent is i lusi rateu by r..gure 15. Each
transfer of organisms involves three factors:
'r	
_
The probability of ejection from the i'th item
PEJi •
of flight equipment
P	 :	 The probability of transferring the organism
•
	
Tip/1	 from item i' to item i.
PA. 	 The probability of the organism adhering to
- .	
item i
In combination, the burden on an_item at,a given 'event may be
related to its burden a a previous event and the redistributed burden from
another item may be stated-as
Ni si + 1;.. = Ni s PSUR + Ni s , j PEJ , 
PTill, PA	 (18)
1 C	 i	 :	 i
Jl' 11
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The sensitivity of the burden at shroud separation may be evaluated
by using Figure 10, introduced for the !fly-by analysis, since the forms of
equations (18) and (6) are the same. The potential for recontaminating the
lander capsule for the cruise phase and subsequent events is evaluated below.
3.2.4.1 Cruis e Phase
,Figure 17 illustrates the recontamination factors associated with
the cruise phase. The sources of contamination are the bioshield external
surface and the spacecraft surfaces. The lander capsule and bioshield internal
surface- are assumed to be sterile as a result of the terminal sterilization
process.
Penetration of the bioshield base appears to be of relatively
_less significance than penetration of the cap. The base must be constructed
of heavier gage material to withstand - .the structural loads imposed by providing
support for the cap. If the capsule installation is such that the aeroshell
t	 ;
points toward the spacecraft, as.shown in Figure 15	 ,	 g	 , ;organs«s penetrating thc
base will impactthe aeroshell and be subjected to high heat fluxes during
atmospheric entry, reducing 
PSA in the general contamination equation. With 	 {-	 ,
the'aeroshell installed in this manner, however, the _base cover is exposed
to organisms which penetrate -the - thinner material of the bioshield cap, as
well as directly to ejector-after bioshield separa-tion.! These organisms will
not receive the high heat fluxes of those on the aeroshell ind will have a
higher P	 Because--of these factors, the 'worst case'' assumption that the
	
a	 SA
aeroshell points toward the spacecraft, as shown in Figure 15, is used for
all phases of this lander recontamination,analysis.
The dislodging forces during; cruise result from:
1. Firing of the spacecraft engine for midcourse
corrections, orbit insertion and orbit trim
maneuvers.
37
^ MICROMETEOROID
	
SEPARATION _
	
—	 PUNCTURE LINE--OF SIGHT
.fit#i
#,t
	
PLANE	 `^^^	 IiIGH V EJECTA
fa3 J	 VERY LOW	 _LOW V EJECTA	 V EJECTA
zior
s4. 00
x&,
}	 SOLAR-PANELS --^
MICROMETEOROIiD— _	 \
	
IM PAC 	
ACS THRUST-_
T	 ^-
3
i^
f
t
E
F-^
R
ri
x
./ C
2.	 Micrometeoroi:d^mpact on the spacecraft and bio-
shield cap.
4.	 Firing of the ACS'for vehicle stabilization and
reorientation.
4.	 Deployment of appendages, incluwng antennas, solar
panels and instrument booms.
"	 Application of sufficient force to spacecraft and bioshie ld
surfaces will result in breaking of the adhesive bond between the organism
and surface,	 Once separated, the organism will be ejected in-one of three
velocity regimes:	 -
!`	 +	 1.	 Very low velocity ejector which re-impact near the
point of dislodging. - -
-
2.	 Low velocity ejector which enter unstable partial orbits
!	 abut the vehicle, re-impacting at random on the bio-
-
-	 sh	 During c ruise,or spacecraft. 	 *_he effects of
radiation pressure may influence the trajectories of
these ejecta toward'or away from the bioshie-ld surface,
3	 High velocity ejecta which either escape from the 	 -
gravitational and electrostatic attractive forces of
the vehicle or impact_on surfaces in.the line-of-sight
I
from the release point.
During cruise, penetration of the bioshield must be` afforded_by
separation debris, structural failure or impact of micrometeoroids.	 The first
two factors can be controlled b 	 design constraints.	 Micrometeoroid impact isi'	 y	 g	 p ,
f	 a factor for which the amount of penetrated area can be estimated.	 During a
given mission, this will depend on the micrometeoroid flux and bioshield design
characteristics, especially surface area and material.strength. 	 A representative
estimate of the total penetrated area for a typical Mars mission was obtained
from reference as 3.4 x 10 8 ft	 2/ft. 2 of a bioshield surface. 2	Because of the
1
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large reduction in the probability of penetration afforded by this small area,
recontamination of the capsule during cruise as a result of micrometeoroid
impact was not considered a significant problem and no further analysis was
conducted for the cruise phase. -
3.2.4.2	 Bioshield Separation Phase
,Figure 18 illustrates the: potential recontamination mechanisms
during the bioshield separation phase. 	 The sources of contamination are the
same as for the cruise phase, but the events providing the dislodging forces
are different.	 These include:
1.	 ACS firing for vehicle orientation and stabilization
before and after separation of the bioshield cap.
I 2.	 Detachment of the bioshield cap from the base by
mechanical or pyrotechnic devices which impart a
.
separation velocity to the cap relative to the space-
craft.
The shock impulses and-vibrations produced by the above events 	 4
will release organisms in all the velocity regimes define& previously. 	 The
1
transfer probability is increased over the cruise phase idue to the exposure
of the"lander capsule base cover, directly to the environment and the possibility,
of direct impact by ejecta.- The recontamination aspects of this mission phase'
are discussed below.
3.2.;4.,2.1	 i Spacecraft. E,jectaI
i
_..
-	 Very low velocity eaecta which reimpact on spacecraft surfaces
may, by definition	 be,neglectedas 'sources of recontaminatiog the lander
- I
capsule.	 For these organisms,	
PEJ
-	 SC
Low velocity ejecta will ,be released with velocities and in
quantities depending on their proximity to the source of the dislodging force
; • IP
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such that a measurable influence on':their trajectory is exerted by the space-
craft's gravity and electrostatic charge. These ejecta will enter into
unstable orbits with re-impact points spread randomly over the bioshield and
spacecraft surfaces.'
It has been shown that the characteristics of these partial orbits
change radically with small changes in the ejection velocity, so random
distribution of the re-impact of these ejecta can be reasonably assumed. 2
 The
source for these ejecta is the entire spacecraft surface, and is not constrained
by.line-of-sight geometry.
The assumption is that, due to the short duration of the bio-
'shield separation phase, solar pressure effects will not significantly
i
influence the orbits, of these ejecta -and they will all re-impact on either)
the spacecraft or exposed base cover. The probability of transferring an
organism to the base ,_cover will be proportional to the ratio between the
.	 i	 $
base cover area to the total vehicle surface area, assuming uniform mass andr	 .	
r
,.	 electrostatic surface charge distribution for the vehicle.
y consideration must be given to angular ratO:s
	
Additionally,
	
_
P	 P	 ymmimparted to the spacecraft due to as etric separation of the bioshield cap,
such that the base cover could rotate into the path of low velocity ejecta
before vehicle re-stabilization is accomplished.
High velocity ejecta present a recontamination problem if
a line-of-sight geometrical relationship exists between the base cover surfaces
and contaminated spacecraftsurfaces, as shown in Figure 18 This source _can be
eliminated, at the expense of weigh, design complexity and reliability, through`
the use of line-of-sight baffles on the bioshield base, as shown in the .Figure.
A general equation for the capsule burden after bioshield separation may be
written as
N 	 N	 = a (	 ) P	 (1 - P	 )m P	 (19)AC,BS	 SC-,EN CI 	 EJSC	 EJgC	 AC
where
ABC/ AV is, the ratio of base cover area to the total vehicle
surface area
i
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m is the number of dislodging events
a is proportional to the line-of-sight geometrical relation-
ships between the spacecraft and base cover surfaces.
3.2.4.2.2	 Bloshield Ejecta 	 -
The low velocity ejecta are a potential problem for the same
reason as for low velocity spacecraft ejecta.	 Like the very low velocity
ejecta, however, release of;the.se organisms is essentially an instantaneous
event associated with the separation itself, since no dislodging forces can be
imparted to the bioshield cap after separation. 	 Asymmetric separation of the
cap must be evaluated, particularly since the likelihood of restabilizing the
bioshield after separation is minimal without complex design ramifications. 	 -
In-the extreme, impact of the
-
cap and base cover is possible.
I High velocity ejecta do not present a recontamination problem,
since none of 'the contaminated surfaces see the exposed base cover. 	 All
theejecta will have radially outward velocity, components at	 time of separation,
assumed to be sufficient to overcome gravitational and electrostatic attractive
forces.
The general equation for the bioshield as'a source of recontamination during
this phase is	 -	
€
NC_:BS / NB EN	 -	 PEJ	 PT	 PA,	
(20)
'S	 B	 B/C	 e.
a.onshipp., between base- cover and spacecraftWhere PT 	depends on_ the area_-ralt i
-
BIc	 -
%.` surfaces as discussed earlier, again assuming random re-impact of low velocity
ejecta ,and `uniform mass; and charge distribution.
3..2.4.3
	
Capsule Separation ` Phase
Figure 19 illustrates the recontamination problem during the
cap;wle separation -'Phase.	 The only source of contamination is now the space-
craft, as the'bioshield cap has'long'since moved away due to its separation
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CJI velocity.	 Dislodging` forces are provided by:f,
,
i
1.	 ACS firing for vehicle orientation and stabilization 	 -	 -
before and after separation of the capsule.
,v
2.	 Detachment of the capsule from the adapter by
mechanical or pyrotechnic devices, which impart a
separation velocity to the capsule relative to the
spacecraft.
The shock 4;mpulses and vibrations associated with these events
will release ejecta in all the velocity regimes. 	 As during the bioshield
separationp has e, the base cover is directly exposed to the environment and
impact of e'ecta.	 After capsule
	 ^	 	 separation, the aeroshell is also vulnerable {
to impact by ejecta.i
Very-low velocity ejecta do not present a recontamination problem,
as they re-impact on the spacecraft itself.
Low velocity ejecta may be of significance until the capsule
achieves a separation distance exceeding the orbital distance of the ejects
to the spacecraft.	 As it moves out, it may impact l.ow velocity ejectsrelative
dislodged by ACS firings just prior to separation, if these-'ejecta are trapped
in partial orbits-which intersect the separation trajectory of the capsule.
High velocity ejects can be precluded from impacting the base cover,
through-the use of line-of-sight baffles and m fission constraints. on maneuvering
'/ the ca sule until sufficient displacement has been achieved.	 After the capsulep	 _	 P	 P
y has moved beyond the "cone of protection" offered by the bio.shield base and
line-of-sight baffles, the aeroshell is vulnerable to•impact by ejecta which
arel dislodged with a velocity exceeding the capsule separation velocity,	 If---
.	 _ the angular rates of the . capsule due to asymmetrical separation are great
-^ enough, the base cover may also be exposed to impact by high velocity ejecta.
' As noted,earlier;-recontamination of the base cover 'is of greater consequence
f
to planetary contamination than recontamination of the- aeroshell, due to the
higher heat . flux on the aeroshell during atmospheric entry.
A general equation for recontamination of the capsule during
separation is
NC, CS / NSC,BS	 PEJ	 C1 .. PEJ 
^m 
PT	
PA	 (21)
SC_	 SC	 SC/C	 C
is a factor depending on the geometrical relationships
between the spacecraft lines-of-sight surfaces and the
capsule surfaces _during the capsule separation sequence.
f4.1 Literature Survey
Most of the, data in the literature is expressed as estimates of the
magnitude of the physical phenomena involved, rather than probability of
f	 t	 t.	 t	 E -- i	 t 1-	 It	 d o-1 t • 1occurrence o 	 amana ion even s0	 xper men a resu s an a a y ica
conclusions are of limited value, due to the specific nature of the assumptions
involved.
4.2 Sensitivity Analyses
fA
7 r ­ 4
probability of ejection during cruise and the number of organisms on the space-
craft at shroud separation. 	 The probability of contamination of the planet is
a direct function of the number of organisms ejected after encounter, but in this
case the period of potential contamination includes the orbital operations phase
and/or the duration of planetary quarantine constraints.
	 The number of organisms
ejected from the orbiter surfaces is exponentially related to the probability
of ejection, with the number of dislodging events as the exponent.
	 The
importance of the burden at the beginning of the orbital period has been shown,
and by extension the conclusions for the fly-by mission regarding the importance
of the shroud separation burden and the effects of the launch phase also are
applicable.
4.2.3	 Lander Capsule
The conclusions regarding the sensitivity of the burden on the
spacecraft and bioshield cap at encounter are analogous to those for the missions
discussed above.
	 The problem of redistribution of burden among the items of
^_^^.,,' flight equipment is added for this type of mission.	 The contamination problem
during cruise, bioshield separation and capsule separation is similar to the
fly-by and 'Orbiter missions, in that the probability of ejection is still the
dominant parameter.
	 Important differences exist, however-, -among th6mission'
phases of the lander capsule regarding the -potential for recontamination.'p
During cruise-	 access to the sterile lander must be afforded through
a compromise of bioshield integrity such as micrometeoroid punctures.	 Because
of the small penetrated area and the low number of punctures for a typical
mission,-
 and the geometrical constraints on impact of high velocity ejecta,
recontamination during cruise was determined not to be a significant problem,, ­ :
During bioshield separation, direct exposure of the sterile lander
surfaces to impact7by high or low velocity ejects presents a greater recon-
tamination problem tha
,
n--exists during cruise. 	 High velocity ejec%'.-a require
Ia line-of-sight geometrical relationship between the base cover and contaminated
spacecraft surfaces, a condition which can be precluded through.the use of
physical baffles.	 Low velocity ejects. are more of a problem as nodesign or
17
4, _
e
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mission constraints are readily apparent to preclude-their re-impacting on
the base cover. Therefore, the number of organisms ejected in the low
a velocity regime must be determined. To do this, the velocity range which
N	 causes re-impact, the probability-of ejecting organisms in this velocity
_	 range, the number of dislodging events during the bioshield separation
phase and the burden distribution on the spacecraft and bioshield are all
factors requiring evaluation for the specific design and mission being
studied. The exponential relationships between surface burden, probability
of ejection and number of organisms ejected that were developed for the
1	 orbiter analysis are equally valid for this phase of the lander capsule
analysis.
Similar conclusions are advanced for the capsule separation phase,
with the additional problem of impact by high velocity ejects requiring
'nation of the number of organisms ejected in this regime, thedetermi
f	 probability of ejection and the burden at time of capsule separation. The`
r	
^.
exponential relationship between ejection probability and ejected burden is.
ti	 also valid here.
The problem of asymmetrical separation of the bioshield cap and 	 it
lander capsule was also -identified as potentially affecting the recontamination
probability, as geometriical .relationships regarding line-of-sight between
sterile and contaminated surfaces could be altered. Design and mission con-
straints-on spacecraft and capsule re-stabilization and manuevering require
evaluation in the light of the potential recontamination hazard.
j
5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
x.	 To maximize the benefits `obtained from this program, it is recommended
y	 e Ferfarmed. These analyses should includethat further anal ses b	 the following
1. Establishing the"sensitivity of the probabilities of ejection,
transfer and adhesion to the environments and forces acting on
t
! ',	 the spacecraft during cruise and operations.
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IAPPENDIX A
ABSTRACTS OF SELECTED REFERENCES
14; Q
TITLE: "NON-EXISTENCE OF A 'BIOTA-CLOUD' RE-(,YJNTAMINATION..HAZARD_FOR_A PLANETARY LANDER,"
J. Friedrich Vandrey, RIAS, MARTIN-MARIETTA CORPORATION, DECEMBER, 1967
INFORMATION OR DATA
Tobey's analysis showing 8% of bioburden required to contaminate to Pr=10 -4
 for 200 day
mission.
D = 6m, M 10 4 kg
Spores' D = 10-6m, M = 10 15 kg
"Dust" particles; D
	 10-4m, in = 10-9 kg
S/C gravity = 10 7 m/sect
escape velocity = 10 -3 m/sec
2.5 x 10-2-104
 times spacecraft gravity for dust spores respectively
I m/sec for 10-4 -10-6
 m particles over diameter of S/C
Assumes metallic surface with mirror finish on orbiter
T = 2700 k, e	 1
4 watts/m2
 sufficient to overpower S/C gravity for particles up to 5 x 10 -5 m
Due to: 1. Interaction with UV component of solar radiation
2. Interaction with plasma of solar wind
Oblique angle striking S/C at 45 0 to direction of travel
PAGE	 SUBJECT
4	 Biobarrier thickness
and bioburden
7	 Spacecraft mass
Properties
Particle mass
Properties
8	 Gravitational
Forces
9	 Solar Pressure
Acceleration
10	 Solar Pressure
Velocity
11	 Reflected Solar
Radia tion
11-12 Surface Temper-
atures & Emissivity
13	 Canister Surface
Radiation
14-1.5	 Electrical; fields
16	 Direction of
Solar Wind
tom%
r
_Q!
Effect of Solar	 No reason to expect release of biota with velocity adequate to recontaminate.
Wind
r
A2
PAGE SUBJECT INFORMATION OR DATA
16 Electron Bombardment Electrical acceleration ranges from 6.8 x 10 -8 to 1.6 x 10 -6 m/sec for spores and 'dust
particles.
23 Interplanetary Radius of gyration of particles is 300 m: inconsequential.
Magnetic Field
25 Summary of inter- Dissipative interactions of environment greater than S/C gravity, which alone can retain
action effects particles.
29 Gas leaks & Helium jet assumed:	 T = 273 0 K
ACS firing V = 1300 m/sec,
M =
 10-3 kg/sec 2F = 1.3 k- m/sec
Turns s/c by one radian/2-3 min.
30 Plume impingement Geometrically and physically impossible due to hemispherical pattern of exhaust.
Plume boundary Cannot recontaminate due to gas particle density.
layer
34 Mid-course Safe up to 8 days according to Tobey.
maneuver hazard
41N
PAGE
3-93
3-97
3-98
3-99
4-6
4-15
Appendix
D
SUBJECT
Lander
Recontamination
Lander Separation
Recontamination
Matrix
Fraction Ejected
at Bioshield
Opening
UV Radiation on
Clumps
Solar Pressure and
UV Radiation
Microme teo ro id
Effects
t
TITLE: "VOLUME 3 - PLANETARY QUARANTINE STUDY," GE DOCUMENT NUMBER VOY-CO-FR,
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 	 28 JULY 1970
INFORMATION OR DATA
Comprehensive survey of recontamination events and state of knowledge concerning the
various sources.
Evaluates alternate separation concepts.
Presents analytical. approach for evaluation of numerical probability of contamination of
planet due to recontamination of sterile lander. Tabulates representative values of
probabilities associated with sub-events.
.02 < Pr < .1 for surf ace area 100 f t2 <A s < 1300 ft2.
Discusses protection offered -to spores: by clumping and shielding from surrounding material
against the lethal effects of UV radiation.
Probability of surviving entry and transport phases. UV kill almost total: Pr of
survival = 7 x 10-8 for single organism.
Analytical and-theoretical studies of micrometeoroid impact effects on release of organism
from spacecraft surfaces. Includes: survey of previous and related work; analytical
studies related to amount and size of particles released; effects on viability of organism
experimental results from impact tests.
Evaluates problems related to small particles on spacecraft surfaces, including: size
ranges and distribution; types of materials; sources of particles. Compares distribution ''k
of particles deposited during manufacture to those generated during flight.	 C
Analysis of electrostatic forces acting on particles ejected near spacecraft. Reflection
of ACS gas from spacecraft and bio-shield surfaces after separation is considered. Random
motion of particles along spacecraft surface analyzed.
h
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A3
TITLE "CONTINUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TYPICAL MARS LANDING CAPSULE STERILIZATION CONTAINER,"
A`JCO Corgi. Applied Technology Division, Report AVATD-0081-69-RR Contract NAS 8-20682, Final Report
INFORMATION OR DATA
Analysis assuming bio-barrier composed of 0.02 in. aluminum overlaid with eight 0.005 in.
aluminized mylar sheets 0.125 in,. apart. Average punctured .area S = 3.4 x 10 -8ft2 /ft 2 of
canister area. Estimated Pr (recontamination) from particle entering meteoroid hole =
1.1 x 10-4.
From L = 2P c/ IS A P c
Where P c = 10-4 , and A = 650 f t2 ,
L 82000 micro organisms/ft 2 redistributed on spacecraft surface.
Estimates 105 -106 orgs/f t2 on spacecraft exterior at time of Launch, or 8% must be
redeposited for Pr > 10-4,
Considers information on deployment shock to be insufficient at this time.
"decade reduction in a few seconds"
4 : 1075 rads required for decade reduction, therefore 10 hrs exposure required.
Vanderwaals attraction: graph of force vs separation distance. Experimental data show that
g = 34 releases significant numbers of organisms, but tightly bound microbes not released
by g = 7000.
Vanderwaals force effective up Co 10- 4 cm.
8 x 10- 23 Newtons; may be neglected. 	 r-^
Spacecraft: Spherical, metal 1-10m dia. 10 2-10 4 kg mass, 0-10v + potential
Solar wind: p = 1 proton/cm 3 , 1 electron/cm3
V = 500 km/sec, a = 8m, magnetic field = 5 x 10 -5 gauss
Microbes: Mass = 10- 1 5 -10- 8
 kg
Di a = 10­6 _10-4m ^'
P = lg/ cm3
Max excess charge = 3 x 10 9
 (dia)m
PAGE
	
SUBJECT
3	 Meteoroid Punctures
Deployment
65;	 Solar UV Lethality
66
	
Solar Protons
-Lethality
66-67	 Forces Binding
Organism to Surface
73
74
	 Interplanetary
i
	 Magnetic Field
Parameters for
Idealized Model
t
`^ a
INFORMATION OR DATA
V	 1.35 x 10.6 /a, where a = particle diameter in m & V=max escape (m/sec) assuming
s/c charge = +7v and particle charge = -10v.
Assuming Vsc = 0.3 m/sec, Tcrit _ 45 sec during which particle travels 19.5 m. If
particle does not escape, T = 43-180 sec.
Large particles (>100p) = neglect all but solar radiation.
Small particles - primarily influenced by electrostatic forces.
Particles with velocities near escape threshold have longest excursion times.
1. Particles located in line-of-sight of the unreleased lander at moment of canister lid
separation.
2. Large particles ejected directly toward the lander deployment corridor by any
deployment maneuver.
3. Small particles pulled into a collision course by attraction to the spacecraft.
Table of test data for frequencies, accelerations given vs number of organisms detected.
Defines "opportunity probability factors" related to mission events and "transport
probability factors" related to survival and capture of organisms.
Effect of bio shield pressure on sterility
	 in. of H2O. Ap above ambient sufficient
at ambient.
Canister venting system: pore type filters weight prohibitive. If one assumes venting
and survival of environment, P t P  must be small.
Conservative valves of event probabilities:
P r
 (organism survives environment) = 10-3
Pr
 (organism survives entry, etc.) = 10-5
Recommend tests for evaluation of venting made, but not cruise mode events. Lid separation
can be simulated for times up to one second.
PAGE	 SUBJECT
	
9--82
	 P a'r ticle Escape
Velocity
Spacecraft Over-
takes Escaped
Particle
Predominant Forces
86
	
Particle Capture
88
	
Pximary Recontam
-ination-Hazards
94-95	 Release of Organ-
isms Due to
'vibration
	
l 127f f`
	 Recontamination
Model
132
132
133
134
	
Ground Test
Certif i cation
A5
PAGE	 SUBJECT
137
	
Deployment Locale
and Orientation
Parameters
140-141	 Possible Flight
Tests
A-30-33	 Sequence of Events
I
INFORMATION OR.DATA
Direction of sun, solar radiation flux, solar wind flux.
Direction and range of planet, density and temperature of atmosphere, velocity of
spacecraft, orientation of spacecraft.
Assume interplanetary conditions prevail at large range from planet. Treat spacecraft as
immobile object in solar wind. Closer, consider as having orbital velocity in rarified
ionized gas.
1. Survival of microbes on unprotected surfaces subject to vibration
2. ' Acceleration and shock levels to release organisms
3. Mobility of tagged particles, including particle size, transport distance and decay
time of particle fallout
4. Cumulative effects of environment
5. Potential difference of sun and shadow surfaces
6. Electrical properties of plasma medium
Description of events and their contamination potential. Tables of information.
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FIGURE 1. RECONTAMINATION FACTORS FOR FLY-BY, ORBITER
AND LANDER CAPSULE M ISS IONS.
